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Abstract 
This paper provides a fully micro-founded New Keynesian framework to study the interaction 
between oil price volatility, pricing behavior of firms and monetary policy. We show that when oil 
has low substitutability, firms find it optimal to charge higher relative prices as a premium in 
compensation for the risk that oil price volatility generates on their marginal costs. Overall, in general 
equilibrium, the interaction of the aforementioned mechanisms produces a positive relationship 
between oil price volatility and average inflation, which we denominate inflation premium. We 
characterize analytically this relationship by using the perturbation method to solve the rational 
expectations equilibrium of the model up to second order of accuracy. The solution implies that the 
inflation premium is higher when: a) oil has low substitutability, b) the Phillips Curve is convex, and 
c) the central bank puts higher weight on output fluctuations. We also provide some quantitative 
evidence showing that a calibrated model for the US with an estimated active Taylor rule produces a 
sizable inflation premium, similar to the levels observed in the US during the 70s. 
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1 Introduction
In an inuential paper, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000, from now on CGG), advanced the
idea that the high average levels of ination observed in the USA during the 1970s could
be explained mainly by the failure of monetary policy to properly react to higher expected
ination. In addition, they pointed out that oil price shocks played a minor role in generating
those levels of ination. CGG based their conclusions on the estimation of monetary policy
reaction functions for two periods: pre- and post-Volcker1. Their estimates show that during
the 1970s, as expected ination rose the FED allowed the real short term interest rate to
decline. In contrast, during the post-Volcker period the FED became more active, by raising
the real interest rate in response to higher ination expectations. Cogley and Sargent (2002)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) nd similar evidence.
This evidence, however, is not conclusive. In a series of papers, Sims and Zha (2005),
Canova, Gambetti and Pappa (2005), Primiceri (2004), Gordon (2005) and Leeper and Zha
(2003) nd weak evidence of a substantial change in the reaction function of monetary policy
after Volcker 2. In particular, they nd evidence that the fall in both aggregate volatility
and average ination is related to a sizeable reduction of the volatility of the main business
cycle driving forces3. Moreover, they highlight that in order to estimate the reaction function
of the central bank, it is necessary to consider changes in the variance of structural shocks.
Otherwise, these estimations may be biased towards nding signicant shifts in coe¢ cients in
the monetary policy rule.
Motivated by this recent evidence, in this paper we provide an analytical and tractable
framework that can be used to study the relationship between structural shocks volatility, in
particular oil price shocks, and the average level of ination. In doing so, we use a standard
microfounded New Keynesian model with staggered Calvo pricing where the central bank
implements its policy following a Taylor rule. We modify this simple framework considering oil
as a production input for intermediate goods. A key assumption in our setup to generate this
relationship is that oil is di¢ cult to substitute in production, thus we use a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) production function with an elasticity lower than one as a prime of our
model. Then, we solve the rational expectations equilibrium of this model up to second order
1 It refers to the appointment of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve System of the USA.
2Orphanides (2001) shows that when real time data are used to estimate policy reaction functions, the
evidence of a change in policy after 1980 is weak.
3The literature has also associated oil prices to periods of recession. Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)
argue that monetary policy played a larger role during the 1970s in explaining the negative output dynamics.
On the other hand, Hamilton (2001) and Hamilton and Herrada (2004) nd out that the results of previous
authors rely on a particular identication scheme and, on the contrary, they nd that a contractionary monetary
policy played only a minor role on the contractions in real output, oil prices being the main source of shock.
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of accuracy using the perturbation method developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
The second-order solution has the advantage of incorporating the e¤ects of shocks volatility
on the equilibrium, which are absent in the linear solution. We implement this method both
analytically and numerically4. The former allows us to disentangle the key determinants of
the relationship between volatility of oil price shocks and the average level of ination, and the
latter allows us to quantify the importance of each mechanism.
Using a similar model, CGG concluded that oil prices are not able to generate high average
levels of ination, unless monetary policy is passive. Instead our results give an important
role to oil price volatility even with an active monetary policy. In our set up, oil prices play a
central role on ination determination and on the trade-o¤ faced by the central bank. The key
di¤erence between CGG and our set up is that we use a second-order solution for the rational
expectations equilibrium, instead of a log-linear one.
Thus, the second-order solution, by relaxing certainty equivalence, allows us to establish
a link between the volatility of oil price shocks and the average level of ination, absent in a
log-linear model. We dene this extra level of average ination as the time varying level of
ination premium5. Moreover, the analytical solution allowed us to identify and to disentangle
the sources of ination premium in general equilibrium6.
There are many novel results to highlight. First, the solution up to second order shows that
oil price volatility produces an extra level of ination by altering the way in which forward-
looking rms set their prices. In particular, when oil has low substitutability, marginal costs
are convex in oil prices, hence its price volatility increases the expected value of marginal costs.
Second, oil price volatility, by generating ination volatility, induces price-setters to be
more cautious to future expected marginal costs. In particular, their relative price becomes
more sensitive to marginal costs, amplifying the previously mentioned channel.
Third, relative price dispersion, by increasing the amount of labour required to produce a
given level of output, increases average wages. So, relative price dispersion amplies the e¤ect
of expected marginal costs over average ination.
Fourth, we nd that, in general equilibrium, the weight that the central bank puts on
output uctuations is a key determinant for positive level of ination premium. As a result,
we show that the larger the endogenous responses of a central bank to output uctuations,
4As part of our contribution, we use a novel strategy for the analytical solution. In contrast with other
papers in which the perturbation method is applied directly to the non-linear system of equations, instead we
rst approximate the model up to second order and then we apply the perturbation method to this approximated
model.
5The extra level of ination generated by volatility is similar to the e¤ect of consumption volatility on the
level of average savings as in the literature of precautionary savings.
6We are not aware of any other paper in the literature that has obtained and developed the concept of
ination premium in general equilibrium.
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the greater the level of ination premium. This nding is consistent with the fact that, in
the model, oil price shocks generate an endogenous trade-o¤ between stabilizing ination and
output gap. Hence a benevolent central bank would choose to put a positive weight on output
gap stabilization and would generate ination premium.7
Finally, we also evaluate the implications of the model with numerical exercises calibrated
for the US economy. For the calibration, we consider that oil price shocks have exhibited a
change in their volatility across the pre- and post-Volcker periods. Our results are broadly
consistent with predictions of the analytical solution. Remarkably, we are able to generate
a level of ination premium similar to the one observed during the 1970s in the USA even
when an active monetary policy, as in CGG, is in place. Also, we show that the convexity of
the Phillips curve accounts for 59 percent of the ination premium in the pre-Volcker period,
whereas the e¤ects of oil price volatility on marginal costs accounts for another 45 percent.
Overall, we nd that the model can track quantitatively the average values of ination fairly
well. We check the robustness of our results with alternative estimated Taylor rules, yet the
qualitative results do not change. Hence, our results provide support to the empirical ndings
of Sims and Zha (2005) that second moments of shocks might be important to understand
the change in macroeconomic behavior observed in the US economy without relying on an
accommodative monetary policy.
Closer to our work is the recent paper by Evans and Hnatkovska (2005), who evaluate
the role of uncertainty in explaining di¤erences in asset holdings in a two-country model.
Also, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) develop an explicit stochastic New Open Economy model
relaxing the assumption of certainty equivalence. Based on simplied assumptions, they obtain
analytical solutions for the level exchange rate premium. Di¤erently from Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1998) and the aforementioned authors, in this paper we perform both a quantitative and
analytical evaluation of the second-order approximation of the New Keynesian benchmark
economy in order to account for the level of ination premium generated by oil shocks volatility.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts for the US
economy on the relationship between oil price volatility and the level of ination. Also, this
section presents an informal explanation of the link between oil price volatility and the ination
mean. In section 3 we outline a benchmark New Keynesian model augmented with oil as a
non-produced input and we discuss its implications for monetary policy. Section 4 explains the
mechanism at work in generating the level of ination premium and we also nd the analytical
7This trade-o¤ emerges when we allow for a distorted steady-state along the CES production function. In
constrast, Blanchard and Galí (2006) nd that with a Cobb-Douglas production function, oil price shocks do
not generate a trade-o¤ between the stabilization of ination and output gap. In order to generate the trade-o¤,
they rely on a reduced form of real rigidities in the labor market. Montoro (2006) characterizes this trade-o¤
from the quadratic approximation of the welfare of the representative agent
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solution of ination premium. In section 5 we report the numerical results. In the last section
we draw conclusions.
2 Motivation
2.1 Average Ination and Oil Price Volatility
Inspection of US ination data seems to suggest that average ination rate and the volatility
of oil prices followed a similar pattern during the last 30 years. Thus, Figure 2.1 plots in the
left hand axis, with a solid line the annual ination rate of the US, measured by the non-farm
business sector deator (LXNFI), and in the right hand axis, with a dotted line, the real oil
price in log 8. As the gure shows, both the volatility of the real oil prices and the average
quarterly annualized ination rate has increased during the rst half of the sample, 1970.1-
1987.2, and has fallen in the second half, 1987.3-2005.2. In the rst sub-sample, the standard
deviation of real oil prices reached 0.57 and the average level of ination 5.5 percent, whereas
during the second sub-sample, the same statistics fall to 0.20 and 2.1 percent, respectively.
Interestingly, also the dynamics of ination seems to closely mimic that of oil prices. Thus,
in the rst sub-sample we observe a persistent initial increase in ination vis-a-vis the increase
in oil prices following the oil price shock in 1974. Instead, from 1980 on we observe a steady
decline in ination accompanied by a persistent drop in oil prices. For the second sub-sample,
we observe also a close co-movement between ination and oil prices; from the early nineties
until 1999 there is a downward trend in both oil prices and ination, whereas from 2000 on we
observe a markedly upward trend in oil and a moderate increase in ination.
In a nutshell, the data seem to suggest that the change in oil price volatility may yield
some information about the behavior of the mean of the ination rate from the 1970s on. This
evidence motivates the development of the model and the mechanism that we highlight in the
coming sections in order to generate a link between average ination and oil price volatility in
a New Keynesian framework.
2.2 The Link between Average Ination and Oil Price Volatility
Before moving to a general equilibrium analysis, in this section we provide the intuition of how
the mechanism that links ination and oil price volatility operates. For that purpose, we use
a stylized two period price setting partial equilibrium model.
Suppose that some rms producing a di¤erentiated good set prices one period in advance.
They face a downward sloping demand function of the type, Yt(z) =

P t (z)
Pt
 "
Y; where "
8We obtain the data from the Haver USECON database (mnemonics are in parentheses).
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Figure 2.1: US ination and oil prices
represents the elasticity of substitution across goods and Y aggregate output, which we assume
is xed9. Under these assumptions, the optimal pricing decision of a particular rm z for time
t is given by mark-up over the expected next period marginal cost,
P t (z)
Pt 1
= Et 1 [	tMCt] (2.1)
where , MCt and 	t =
"+1t
Et 1"t
denote the mark-up, rm´s marginal costs and a measure of
the responsiveness of the optimal price to future marginal costs, respectively. A second order
Taylor expansion of the expected responsiveness to marginal cost, 	t;is given by:
Et 1 [	t] = Et 1

t +
1
2
(2"+ 1)2t

(2.2)
From the above expression it is worthnoting that Et 1	t is a convex function on expected
ination. This convexity implies that ination volatility increases the weight that a rm
put on expected marginal costs. In order to gain further insights, lets assume the following
marginal cost function:
MCt = 1qt +
2
2
q2t (2.3)
where qt represents the real price of oil, 1 > 0measures the linear e¤ect of oil over the marginal
9This assumption helps to highlight the channels by which supply shocks as oil prices a¤ect ination. In
section 3 we consider a fully general equilibrium model in which output is endogenous.
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cost and 2 accounts for the impact of oil price volatility on marginal costs. When 2 > 0,
marginal costs are convex in oil prices, thus expected marginal costs become an increasing
function of the volatility of oil prices.10.
Di¤erent forms of aggregation of sticky prices in the literature show that the ination rate is
proportional to the optimal relative price of rms (equation (2.1)). Hence, when marginal costs
are convex, both the optimal relative price and ination are increasing in oil price volatility.
More importantly, other channels amplify the previous e¤ect. To the extent that oil price
volatility increases ination volatility, price setters react by increasing the weight they put on
marginal costs, 	t, when setting prices. As equation (2.2) shows, up to second order, this
weight depends not only on the level of expected ination but also on its volatility. Yet, are
those second order e¤ects important? Two special features of oil prices, its high volatility
and its low substitutability with other production factors, make those second order e¤ects
quantitative sizable. Hence, a linear approximation that omits the role of both oil price and
ination volatilities would not capture enough of the dynamics of ination. In constrast,
the second order solution of the rational expectations equilibrium of the model allows us to
establish the link between average inations and shocks volatility.
In the next section we formalize this link by obtaining a second order rational expectations
solution of a New Keynesian general equilibrium model with oil prices. We use this model to
show under which conditions the marginal cost of rms becomes a convex function of oil price
shocks. Interestingly, we also show how relative price distortions and monetary policy might
amplify the e¤ect of uncertainty, inducing a meaningful level of ination premium.
3 A New Keynesian Model with Oil Prices
The model economy corresponds to the standard New Keynesian Model in the line of CGG
(2000). In order to capture oil shocks we follow Blanchard and Gali (2006) by introducing a
non-produced input M , represented in this case by oil. Q denotes the real price of oil which is
assumed to be exogenous.
3.1 Households
We assume the following period utility on consumption and labor
Ut =
C1 t
1    
L1+t
1 + 
; (3.1)
10 In section 4 we show that when the production function is a CES with an elasticity of substitution between
labor and oil lower than one, then marginal costs are convex on oil prices, that is 2 > 0.
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where  and  represent the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and the inverse of the elasticity of labor
supply, respectively. The optimizer consumer takes decisions subject to a standard budget
constraint which is given by
Ct =
WtLt
Pt
+
Bt 1
Pt
  1
Rt
Bt
Pt
+
 t
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
(3.2)
where Wt is the nominal wage, Pt is the price of the consumption good, Bt is the end of
period nominal bond holdings, Rt is the nominal gross interest rate ,  t is the share of the
representative household on total nominal prots, and Tt are transfers from the government11.
The rst order conditions for the optimizing consumer´s problem are:
1 = Et
"
Rt

Pt
Pt+1

Ct+1
Ct
 #
(3.3)
Wt
Pt
= Ct L

t =MRSt (3.4)
Equation (3:3) is the standard Euler equation that determines the optimal path of consump-
tion. At the optimum the representative consumer is indi¤erent between consuming today or
tomorrow, whereas equation (3:4) describes the optimal labor supply decision. MRSt denotes
the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. We assume that labor mar-
kets are competitive and also that individuals work in each sector z 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, L
corresponds to the aggregate labor supply:
L =
Z 1
0
Lt(z)dz (3.5)
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Final Good Producers
There is a continuum of nal good producers of mass one, indexed by f 2 [0; 1] that operate
in an environment of perfect competition. They use intermediate goods as inputs, indexed by
z 2 [0; 1] to produce nal consumption goods using the following technology:
Y ft =
Z 1
0
Yt(z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
(3.6)
11 In the model we assume that the government owns the oil´s endowment. Oil is produced in the economy at
zero cost and sold to the rms at an exogenous price Qt: The government transfers all the revenues generated
by oil to consumers represented by Tt
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where " is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Then the demand function
of each type of di¤erentiated good is obtained by aggregating the input demand of nal good
producers
Yt(z) =

Pt (z)
Pt
 "
Yt (3.7)
where the price level is equal to the marginal cost of the nal good producers and is given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1 " dz
 1
1 "
(3.8)
and Yt represents the aggregate level of output.
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y ft df (3.9)
3.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate good producers. All of them have the following CES
production function
Yt(z) =
h
(1  ) (Lt(z))
  1
 +  (Mt (z))
  1
 
i  
  1
(3.10)
where M is oil which enters as a non-produced input;  represents the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between labor-input and oil and  denotes the share of oil in the production
function. We use this generic production function in order to capture the fact that oil has
few substitutes12, in general we assume that. is lower than one. The oil price shock, Qt, is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs,
logQt = logQ+  logQt 1 + "t (3.11)
12Since oil has few substitutes an appealing functional form to capture this feature is the CES production
function. This function o¤ers exibility in the calibration of the degree of substitution between oil and labor.
Some authors that have included oil in the analysis of RBC models and monetary policy, have omitted this
feature. For example, Kim and Loungani (1992) assume for the U.S. a Cobb-Douglas production function
between labor and a composite of capital and energy. Given that they calibrate their model considering that
oil has a small share on output, they found that the impact of oil in the U.S. business cycle is small . Notice
that when  = 1; the production function collapses to the standard Cobb-Douglas function as the one used by
Blanchard and Gali (2006): Yt(z) = (Lt(z))
1 Mt :
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where Q is the steady state level of oil price. From the cost minimization problem of the rm
we obtain an expression for the real marginal cost given by:
MCt(z) =
"
(1  ) 

Wt
Pt
1  
+  (Qt)
1  
# 1
1  
(3.12)
where MCt (z) represents the real marginal cost, Wt nominal wages and Pt the consumer
price index. Note that since technology has constant returns to scale and factor markets are
competitive, marginal costs are the same for all intermediate rms, i.e. MCt (z) = MCt. On
the other hand, the individual rm´s labor demand is given by:
Ldt (z) =

1
1  
Wt=Pt
MCt
  
Yt(z) (3.13)
Intermediate producers set prices following a staggered pricing mechanism a la Calvo. Each
rm faces an exogenous probability of changing prices given by (1  ). The optimal price that
solves the rms problem is given by

P t (z)
Pt

=
Et
 1P
k=0
kt;t+kMCt+kF
"+1
t;t+kYt+k

Et
 1P
k=0
kt;t+kF
"
t;t+kYt+k
 (3.14)
where   "" 1 is the price markup, t;t+k = k

Ct+k
Ct
 
Pt
Pt+k
is the stochastic discount
factor, P t (z) is the optimal price level chosen by the rm, Ft;t+k =
Pt+k
Pt
the cumulative level
of ination and Yt+k is the aggregate level of output.
Since only a fraction (1  ) of rms changes prices every period and the remaining one
keeps its price xed, the aggregate price level, the price of the nal good that minimize the
cost of the nal goods producers, is given by the following equation:
P 1 "t = P
1 "
t 1 + (1  ) (P t (z))1 " (3.15)
Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), equations (3:14) and (3.15) can be written re-
cursively introducing the auxiliary variables Nt and Dt (see appendix B:1 for details on the
derivation):
 (t)
" 1 = 1  (1  )

Nt
Dt
1 
(3.16)
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Dt = Yt (Ct)
  + Et
h
(t+1)
 1Dt+1
i
(3.17)
Nt = Yt (Ct)
 MCt + Et [(t+1)Nt+1] (3.18)
Equation (3:16) comes from the aggregation of individual rms prices. The ratio Nt=Dt
represents the optimal relative price P t (z) =Pt: Equations (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) summarize
the recursive representation of the non- linear Phillips curve. Writing the optimal price setting
in a recursive way is necessary in order to implement both numerically and algebraically the
perturbation method.
3.3 Monetary Policy
The central bank conducts monetary policy by targeting the nominal interest rate in the
following way
Rt = R
r
t 1
"
R

Ett+1

 Yt
Y
y#1 r
(3.19)
where,  > 1 and y > 0 measure the response of the nominal interest rate to expected future
ination and output, respectively. Also, the degree of interest rate smoothing is measured by
0  r  1: The steady state values are expressed without time subscript and with and upper
bar.
3.4 Market Clearing
In equilibrium labor, intermediate and nal goods markets clear. Since there is neither capital
accumulation nor government sector, the economywide resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct (3.20)
The labor market clearing condition is given by:
Lst = L
d
t (3.21)
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Where the demand for labor comes from the aggregation of individual intermediate producers
in the same way as the labor supply:
Ld =
Z 1
0
Ldt (z)dz =

1
1  
Wt=Pt
MCt
  Z 1
0
Yt(z)dz (3.22)
Ld =

1
1  
Wt=Pt
MCt
  
Ytt
where t =
R 1
0

Pt(z)
Pt
 "
dz is a measure of price dispersion. Since relative prices di¤er across
rms due to staggered price setting, input usage will di¤er as well. Implying that it is not
possible to use the usual representative rm assumption. Therefore, the price dispersion factor,
t appears in the aggregate labor demand equation. Also, from (3.22) we can see that higher
price dispersion increases the labor amount necessary to produce a given level of output.
3.5 The Log Linear Economy
To illustrate the e¤ects of oil in the dynamic equilibrium of the economy, we take a log linear
approximation of equations (3.3), (3.4),(3.12), (3.16), (3.17), (3.18), (3.19 ) and (3.22) around
the deterministic steady-state13. We denote variables in steady state with upper bar (i.e. X)
and their log deviations around the steady state with lower case letters (i.e. x = log(XtX )).
After, imposing the goods and labor market clearing conditions to eliminate real wages and
labor from the system, the dynamics of the economy are determined by the following equations:
mct =  ( + ) yt + (1  ) qt (3.23)
t = Ett+1 + mct (3.24)
yt = Etyt+1   1

(rt   Ett+1) (3.25)
rt = rrt 1 + (1  r)
 
Ett+1 + yyt

(3.26)
qt = qt 1 + qet (3.27)
where,   1 F
1+v F
, F   

Q
MC
1  
,   1  (1  ) ; and Q, and MC, represent the
steady-state value of oil prices and of marginal costs, respectively.
Interestingly, the e¤ects of oil prices on marginal costs, equation (3.23), depends crucially
on both the share of oil in the production function, , and the elasticity of substitution between
oil and labor, . Thus, when  is large,  is small making marginal costs more responsive to oil
13See appendix A for the derivation of the steady-state of the economy.
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prices. Also, the smaller the  , the greater the impact of oil on marginal costs. It is important
to note that even though the share of oil in the production function, ; can be small, its impact
on marginal cost, F ; can be magnied when oil has few substitutes (that is when  is low)
14. Note also that a permanent increase in oil prices, that is an increase in Q, makes marginal
cost of rms more sensitive to oil price shocks given its e¤ect on F . Finally, when  = 0, the
model collapses to a standard closed economy New Keynesian model without oil.
The model also has a key implication for monetary policy. Notably, it delivers an en-
dogenous trade-o¤ for the central bank when stabilizing ination and output gap. We denote
output gap by xt and it is dened as the di¤erence between the sticky price level of output
and its corresponding e¢ cient level, xt = yt   yEt , where yEt denotes the log deviations of the
e¢ cient level of output. In this economy, the e¢ cient allocation is achieved when MC = 1,
since this equilibrium corresponds to one where intermediate rms are perfectly competitive.
Therefore, when the equilibrium is e¢ cient we have that F 6= E , where, E =   Q1  .
Using the previous denition of output gap, the economy can be represented by two equations
in terms of the e¢ cient output gap, xt and ination, t ( see appendix C for details),
xt = Etxt+1   1

 
it   Ett+1   rEt

(3.28)
t = Ett+1 + yxt + t (3.29)
where t =
q
y

1
(1 E)F
  
F   E qt , q = (1  ) and y =  ( + ). In our model
the endogenous trade o¤ emerges from the combination of a distorted steady state and a CES
production function15. When the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor is equal to one,
the Cobb-Douglas case as in Blanchard and Gali (2006), the trade o¤ disappears. Hence, in
that case, the exible and e¢ cient level of output only di¤er by a constant term, which in turn
implies that E = F . In addition, when monopolistic competition distortion is eliminated,
using a proportional subsidy tax, as in Woodford (2003), the trade-o¤ is inhibited, since again
E = F . The existence of this endogenous trade o¤ implies that it is optimal for the central
bank to allow higher levels of ination in response to supply shocks.
14For example, considering an oil share in the order of 1%. and an elasticity of substitution of 0.6, and
assuming Q = W=P = MC, gives F = (0:01)0:56 = 6%: This share would be even higher if we consider a
higher steady state value of the oil price,Q:
15Benigno and Woodford (2005), in a similar model but without oil price shocks, have found an endogenous
trade-o¤ by combining a distorted steady state with a government expenditure shock. In their framework, the
combination of a distorted steady state along with a non-linear aggregate budget constraint due to government
expenditure is crucial for the existence of this endogenous trade-o¤. Analogously to Benigno and Woodford´s
nding, in our model the combination of a distorted steady state and the non-linearity of the CES production
function delivers a trade-o¤ when considering an e¢ cient level of output such that eliminate monopolistic
distortions. Montoro (2005) demonstrates that this trade-o¤ remains even when monopolistic distortions are
eliminated
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The special features of oil, such as high price volatility and low substitutability in pro-
duction, induce the volatility of oil prices to have a non trivial second order e¤ects that the
log-linear representation described by equations (3.23) to (3.27) does not take into account16.
These second order e¤ects are crucial elements in establishing the link between oil price volatil-
ity and ination premium. The next section provides a log-quadratic approximation of the
economy around its steady-state to study the link between oil price volatility and ination.
4 Ination Premium in General Equilibrium
4.1 The second order representation of the model
In this sub-section we present a log-quadratic (Taylor series) approximation of the fundamental
equations of the model around the steady state. A detailed derivation is provided in Appendix
B:2. The second-order Taylor-series expansion serves to compute the equilibrium uctuations
of the endogenous variables of the model up to a residual of order O

kqt; qk2

, where kqt; qk
is a bound on the deviation and volatility of the oil price generating process around its steady
state17. Up to second order, equations (3.23) - (3.26) are replaced by the following set of
log-quadratic equations:
Aggregate Supply
Marginal Costs
mct = yyt + qqt +
1
2
(1  )2 1  
1 F (( + ) yt   qt)2 + v bt +O  kqt; qk3 (i)
Price dispersionbt =  bt 1 + 12" 1 2t +O  kqt; qk3 (ii)
Phillips Curve
vt = mct +
1
2
mct (2 (1  ) yt +mct) + 12"2t + Etvt+1 +O
 kqt; qk3 (iii)
where we have dened the auxiliary variables:
vt  t + 12

" 1
1  + "

2t +
1
2
(1  )tzt (iv)
zt  2 (1  ) yt +mct + Et

2" 1
1 t+1 + zt+1

+O
 kqt; qk2 (v)
Aggregate Demand
yt = Etyt+1   1 (rt   Ett+1)  12Et

(yt   yt+1)  1 (rt   t+1)
2
+
 kqt; qk3 (vi)
Table 4.1: Second order Taylor expansion of the equations of the model
Equation (i) is obtained taking a second-order Taylor-series expansion of the real marginal
cost equation, and using the labor market equilibrium condition to eliminate real wages. bt
16 In a log-linear representation certainty equivalence holds, thus uncertainty does not play any role.
17Since we want to make explicit the e¤ects of changes in the volatility of oil prices in the equilibrium of the
endogenous variables, we solve the policy functions as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) in terms of qt and
q. This is di¤erent to the approach taken by other authors, for example Woodford (2003), who consider the
policy function in terms of the shocks (et).
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is the log-deviation of the price dispersion measure t, which is a second order function of
ination and its dynamics is represented by equation (ii). Importantly, the second order
approximation adds two new ingredients in the determination of marginal costs. The rst one
is related to the convexity of marginal costs with respect to oil prices. From this expression,
when,  < 1, marginal costs become a convex function of oil prices, hence, the volatility of oil
prices increases expected marginal costs. This is an important channel through which oil price
volatility generates higher ination rates. Notice, however that when the production function
is a Cobb-Douglas,  = 1, this second order e¤ect disappears, and the marginal cost equation
does not depends directly on the volatility of oil prices, but only indirectly through its e¤ects
on relative price dispersion, bt;. In this particular case, marginal costs are given by,
mct = yyt + qqt + v bt
the second new ingredient is associated to the indirect e¤ect of oil price volatility through bt.
From equation (3.22 ), it is clear that as price dispersion increases, the required number of
hours to produce a given level of output also rises. Thus, this higher labor demand increases
real wages, and consequently marginal costs. This e¤ect is higher when the elasticity of labor
supply, 1v is lower and when the participation of oil in production is higher.
Equations (iii), (iv) and (v) in turn represent the second order version of the Phillips curve,
and equation (vi) is the quadratic representation of the aggregate demand which includes the
negative e¤ect of the real interest rate on consumption and the precautionary savings e¤ect.
The second order representation of the aggregate demand considers, additional to the linear
approximation, the e¤ect of the volatility of the growth rate of consumption on savings. Thus,
when the volatility of consumption increases, consumption falls, since households increase their
savings for precautionary reasons. Next we further simplify the model economy by writing it
as a second order two equation system of output and ination. This canonical second order
representation of the economy with oil allows us to disentangle the determinants of the ination
premium.
4.2 Determinants of Ination Premium
Since the second order terms of the equations (i) - (vi) depend on the rst order solution of
the model, we can use the latter to express the second order terms as quadratic functions of
the oil process as in Sutherland (2002): Then, we replace equations (i),(ii),(iv) and (v) in (iii),
and the policy rule of the central bank in equation (vi), to write the model as second order
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system of two equations on ination, output and the oil price18:
t = yyt + qqt + Ett+1 +
1
2
!v
2
q +
1
2
(
mc +
 +
v) q
2
t +O

kqt; qk3

(4.1)
yt = Et (yt+1)  1

 
(   1)Ett+1 + yyt

+
1
2
!y
2
q +O

kqt; qk3

(4.2)
where y and q were dened in the previous section.
We represent the second order terms as function of 2q ; q
2
t and the "omega" coe¢ cients
f
mc;
;
v; !v; !yg , which are dened in appendix B. Each of these "omega" coe¢ cients
represent the second order term in the equations for the marginal costs (subscript mc), the
Phillips Curve (subscript ) , the auxiliary variable vt (subscript v) and the aggregate demand
(subscript y). Given fqtg , the rational expectations equilibrium for ftg and fytg is obtained
from, equations (4.1) and (4.2).
The "omega" coe¢ cients are the sources of ination premium in general equilibrium and
capture the interaction between the nonlinearities of the model and the volatility of oil price
shocks. Coe¢ cients denoted by capital omega (
) represent the time variant components of
the ination premium, whereas coe¢ cients denoted by small omega (!) are time invariant and
depend on the unconditional variance of oil prices. Note that if the aforementioned coe¢ cients
were equal to zero the model would collapse to a standard version of a New Keynesian model
in log linear form. In what follows we provide economic interpretation to the determinants of
the ination premium.
The coe¢ cient 
mc captures the direct e¤ect of oil price volatility on marginal costs and
its indirect e¤ect through the labor market. Lets consider rst its direct e¤ect. When oil has
few substitutes,  < 1, marginal costs are convex in oil prices, hence expected marginal costs
become an increasing function of oil price volatility. To compensate the increase in expected
marginal costs generated by oil price volatility, forward looking rms react by optimally charg-
ing higher prices. This response of rms, in turn, leads to higher aggregate ination when
prices are sticky 19. Interestingly, the increase on marginal costs and ination in response to
oil price volatility is larger when the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor is small.
Additionally, oil price volatility a¤ects marginal cost indirectly, through its e¤ects on the
labor market. Since oil price volatility generates ination volatility, which is costly because it
18To make the analysis analytically tractable , we have eliminated state variables such us the lagged nominal
interest rate by setting the smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule equal to zero. Similarly, we assume an
small initial price dispersion, that is bto 1  0 up to second order. However, in the next section, the numerical
exercises consider the more general specication of the model.
19This mechanism can be understood by observing equation (i), where @
2mct
@q2t
= (1  )2 1  
1 F . When
 < 1( > 1), @
2mct
@q2t
> 0(< 0)
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increases relative price distortions, e¢ ciency in production falls as the volatility of oil prices
increases. In particular, rms require, at the aggregate level, more hours of work to produce
the same amount of output. Hence, the demand for labor rises, making labor more expensive
and increasing marginal cost even further. Then, the increase in marginal costs through both
e¤ects, the direct and indirect, lead to an increases on aggregate ination.
We illustrate these mechanisms in gure 4.1. In panel (a) we plot the relation between

mc and the parameter  . We see that 
mc increases exponentially as  decreases. Also, the
steady state oil price a¤ects the impact of oil prices in marginal costs: the higher the oil price
in steady-state, ceteris paribus, also the higher the e¤ect of oil price volatility on marginal
costs. According to this, in economies where oil is more di¢ cult to substitute in production,
or when the oil price level is relatively high, oil price volatility would be more important in
the determination of the dynamics of ination. Similarly, in panel (b) we plot the relation
between 
mc and the elasticity of labor supply (1=v). We see that a more elastic labor supply
increase the e¤ects of oil price volatility. This latter e¤ect works through the indirect impact
of oil price volatility on the labor market.
On the other hand, the coe¢ cient 
 accounts for the e¤ects of oil price volatility on
the way price setters weight future marginal costs. When prices are sticky and rms face a
positive probability of not being able to change prices, as in the Calvo price-setting model, the
weight that rms assign to future marginal cost depends on both future expected ination and
future expected inations volatility. Oil price volatility by raising ination volatility induces
prices setters to put a higher weight on future marginal costs. Hence, oil price volatility not
only increases expected marginal costs but also make relative price of rms more responsive
to those future marginal costs.
Panel (c) shows that when the elasticity of substitution of goods " increases, it increases
the e¤ect of ination volatility on the price of individual rms and 
 increases. Similarly,
panel (d) shows that lower price stickiness  makes the Phillips curve steepper and also more
convex, then the e¤ects of ination volatility on 
 increases.
The coe¢ cients 
v and !v accounts for the time variant and constant e¤ects of ination
volatility on the composite of ination vt: This mechanism is similar to that of 
, however
both coe¢ cients are quantitatively small. Finally, the coe¢ cient !y is negative and accounts
for the standard precautionary savings e¤ect, by which the uncertainty that oil price volatility
generates induces households to increase savings to bu¤er future states of the nature where
income can be low.
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Figure 4.1: Ination premium components (uses benchmark calibration presented in section
5). a) E¤ects of elasticity of substitution ( ) on 
mc. b) E¤ects of labor supply elasticity (1=v)
on 
mc. c) E¤ects of elasticity of substitution of goods (") on 
. d) E¤ects of price stickyness
() on 
.
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4.3 The analytical solution for ination premium
We use the perturbation method, implemented by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)20, to obtain
the second order rational expectations solution of the model. The second order solution makes
explicitly the potential e¤ects of oil price´s volatility and the dynamics of endogenous variables.
As we mentioned before, we dene ination premium as the extra level of ination that arises
in equilibrium once the second order solution is considered21: Also, di¤erent from other papers
which apply perturbation methods directly to the non-linear system of equations, we rst
approximate the model up to second order and then apply the perturbation method22. Our
proposed approach has the advantage that makes it easier to obtain clear analytical results for
the sources of the level of ination premium.
The rational expectations second order solution of output and ination, in log-deviations
from the steady state, can be written as quadratic polynomials in both the level and the
standard deviation of oil prices:
yt =
1
2
ao
2
q + a1qt +
1
2
a2 (qt)
2 +O

kqt; qk3

(4.3)
t =
1
2
bo
2
q + b1qt +
1
2
b2 (qt)
2 +O

kqt; qk3

(4.4)
where the as and bs are the unknown coe¢ cients that we need to solve for and O

kqt; qk3

denotes terms on q and q of order equal or higher than three23. Notice that the linear terms
(a1qt and b1qt) correspond to the policy functions that we would obtain using any standard
method for linear models (i.e. undetermined coe¢ cients), whereas the additional elements
account for the e¤ects of uncertainty (premium) on the equilibrium variables.
The quadratic terms in the policy function of ination have two components: 12bo
2
q , which
is constant and 12b2 (qt)
2 ; which is time varying. The analytical solution obtained with the
20The perturbation method was originally developed by Judd (1998) and Collard and Julliard (2001). The
xed point algorithm proposed by Collard and Julliard introduces a dependence of the coe¢ cients of the linear
and quadratic terms of the solution with the volatility of the shocks. In contrast, the advantage of the algorithm
proposed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe is that the coe¢ cients of the policy are invariant to the volatility of the
shocks and the corresponding ones to the linear part of the solution are the same as those obtained solving a
log linear approximated model, which makes both techniques comparable.
21 It is important to remark that this extra level of average ination is part of the dynamic rational expectations
equilibrium up to second order, and it can not be interpreted as a part of the steady state equilibrium. This
second order e¤ect on the level ination is similar to the e¤ect of the volatility of consumption on savings that
is known in the literature as precautionary savings.
22Since a second order Taylor expansion is an exact approximation up to second order of any non-linear
equation, having the system expressed in that way would give the same solution as the system in its non-linear
form.
23Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that the quadratic solution does not depend neither on q nor on
qtq . That is, they show that the coe¢ cients in the solution for those terms are zero.
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perturbation method implies the following expression for the overall expected level of ination
premium
E () =
1
2
(bo + b2)
2
q
which can be expressed as:
E () =
1
2
1
0

y (
mc +
 +
v) (1 + 	) + y!v + y!y

2q (4.5)
for 0 = (   1)y+(1  )y > 0 and 	 > 0 dened in the appendix B.4. According to this
closed form, the ination premium is proportional to the oil price volatility and depends on a
linear combination of the "omegas" coe¢ cients. Moreover, these sources of ination premium
interact with monetary policy to determine the sign and size of the premium. Under a Taylor
rule, ination premium will be positive if monetary policy reacts also to uctuations in output
due to oil shocks. From equation (4.5), the ination premium will be positive when :
y >  !yy= [!v + (
mc +
 +
v) (1 + 	)] > 0 (4.6)
since !y is negative, the right hand side is positive. When the coe¢ cient of output uctuations
in the Taylor rule, y, is positive and above this threshold, then the ination premium is
always positive. The higher y; the higher the ination premium. Therefore, when the central
bank reacts also to output uctuations it also generates, in equilibrium, an ination premium.
Yet, if the central bank cares only about ination and does not react to output uctuations,
that is y = 0, then the ination premium would be negative and small. Although oil price
volatility is an important determinant of ination, the previous result shows that in general
equilibrium, the reaction of the central bank turns out to be crucial. A central bank that reacts
only to ination can fully eliminate the e¤ects of oil price volatility on ination raising output
volatility. However, this type of reaction would come at a considerable cost, since output
uctuations are ine¢ cient when they are generated by oil price shocks.
In gure 4.2 we depict the relation between the level of ination premium an the parameter
y: There is a small positive threshold for y such that the premium becomes positive. Also, the
higher the reaction to output uctuations, the higher the premium. Remarkably, the existence
of the ination premium depends crucially on the existence of a trade-o¤ between ination
and output. When the central bank does not face this trade-o¤, it is always possible to nd
a policy rule where the ination premium is zero. The previous implication steams from the
fact that the second order solution depends upon the log-linear one24. Therefore, in order to
24 In a log-linear solution, when the central bank does not face a meaningful trade-o¤ between stabilizing
ination and output, the optimal policy implies both zero ination and output gap.
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observe a positive ination premium a necessary condition is the existence of an endogenous
trade-o¤ for the central bank. Moreover, as shown in the previous section, such trade-o¤ exists
when the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor is lower than one.
Figure 4.2: Ination premium and the output parametery in the policy rule.
5 Some Numerical Experiments
In this section we explore the ability of the model to explain high average levels of ination
in periods of high volatility of oil prices. To obtain the numerical results we use the method
developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), which provides second order numerical solutions
to non-linear rational expectations models .
5.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model we choose standard parameter values in the literature. We set a
quarterly discount factor, , equal to 0:99 which implies an annualized rate of interest of 4%.
For the coe¢ cient of risk aversion parameter, , we choose a value of 1 and the inverse of
the elasticity of labor supply, v, is calibrated to be equal to 0:5, similar to those used in the
RBC literature and consistent with the micro evidence. We choose a degree of monopolistic
competition, ", equal to 11; which implies a rm mark-up of 10% over the marginal cost. The
steady state level of oil price, Q is set equal to the inverse of the mark-up in order to isolate
the e¤ect of the share of oil in the production function. The elasticity of substitution between
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oil and labor,  , is set equal to 0:6 and we use modest value for  = 0:01; so that the share of
oil prices in the marginal cost is around 6%25: The probability of the Calvo lottery is set equal
to 0:66 which implies that rms adjust prices, on average, every three quarters. Finally, the
log of real oil price follows an AR(1) stochastic process with q = 0:95 and standard deviation,
" = 0:14 for the rst sample and q = 0:82 and standard deviation, " = 0:13 for the second
one. These processes imply standard deviations for real oil prices of 0:46 and 0:22 in each
sample, respectively. Our benchmark monetary policy rule is the estimated by CGG for the
post-Volcker period. We also perform robustness exercises by comparing the results of this
benchmark rule with those obtained with the estimated rules by Orphanides (2001) and Judd
and Rudebush (1998)26. The coe¢ cients of the alternative policy rules analysed are presented
in the following table:
CGG Taylor Orphanides Judd-Rudebush
r 0.79 0.00 0.79 0.72
 2.15 1.53 1.80 1.54
y 0.93 0.77 0.27 0.99
Table 5.1: Alternative Policy Rule Coe¢ cients
5.2 Explaining the U.S. Level of Ination Premium with Oil Price Shocks
In this section we evaluate how the model does at capturing the conditional mean of the key
macro variables, in particular of ination. In Table 5.2 we report the means of ination,
output gap and nominal interest rates compared with the values observed in the data based
on our benchmark parameterization27. Notice that by comparing the sub-samples we observe
an important change in means and volatilities in ination, GDP gap, and interest rates across
sub-samples (columns 3 and 5 of table 5.2). Thus, quarterly ination standard deviation has
25We consider a conservative calibration for the share of oil in production. Other authors have considered
a larger share of oil in production or costs. For example, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) use a share of energy in
production of 0.043 and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) a share of energy equal to 5.5% of the labour costs..
26 Importantly, we have used the same Taylor type rule for the overall sample. Values  > 1 and y > 0 are
consistent with recent estimation using bayesian methods by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005). Although the
previous authors nd that from 1982 on, both parameters are estimated to be higher with respect to the overall
sample.
27We use the data from the Haver USECON database (mnemonics are in parentheses). Our measure of the
price level is the non-farm business sector deator (LXNFI), the measure of GDP corresponds to the non-farm
business sector output (LXNFO), we use the quarterly average daily of the 3-month T-bill (FTB3) as the
nominal interest rate, and our measure of oil prices is the Spot Oil Prices West Texas Intermediate (PZTEXP).
We express output in per-capita terms by dividing LXNFO by a measure of civilian non-institutional population
aged above 16 (LNN) and oil prices are deated by the non-farm business sector deator.
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decreased from 0.8% to 0.3% and the mean has moved from 1.4% to 0.5%, between the pre-
Volcker and post-Volcker periods, respectively. Similarly, the three-month T-bill has decreased
in both means and volatilities. Finally, GDP gap has decreased in volatility (from a standard
deviation of 2.8% to 1.3%) and has experimented and increase in its mean (from -0.20% to
0.26%).
To clarify, the simulations that follow are a rst step at exploring whether the mechanisms
we have just have emphasized have potential for explaining the ination-premium. In the
model, we interpret oil price shocks as the main driven force of the ination premium, although
we are aware that in order to closely match the moments of other macro variables, additional
shocks might be necessary. Thus, by performing these numerical exercises we intend to confront
the data to the mechanism previously described. We do so by generating the unconditional
mean of ination, output and interest rates implied by the calibrated model for the pre and
post Volcker periods. The only di¤erence in the calibration between these two periods is the
assumption on the data generating process of oil prices. We t an AR (1) process for oil prices
in each period and nd that both the persistence and the variance of oil price shocks have
fallen from the rst to the second period.
Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
Simulated Observed Simulated Observed
Mean Ination 1.09 1.38 0.19 0.53
Mean Output Gap (HP) -1.35 -0.20 -0.23 0.26
Mean Nominal Interest Rate 4.32 7.65 0.72 5.36
Standard Deviation Ination 1.91 0.80 0.75 0.29
Standard Deviation Output Gap (HP) 2.02 2.79 0.56 1.33
Standard Deviation Nominal Interest Rate 1.64 2.84 0.45 1.44
Standard Deviation Real Oil Price 0.46 0.57 0.22 0.21
Al variables are quarterly, except the nominal interest rate which is annualized.
Table 5.2: Unconditional Moments Generated by the Benchmark Model
The key result to highlight from table 5.2 is that we are able to generate a positive level
of ination premium that allows the model to mimic the average ination level in the US in
the pre-Volcker and post Volcker periods without relying on di¤erent monetary policy regimes
across periods. Remarkably, the model can match very closely the mean of ination for the two
sub-periods. Thus, ination mean during the rst period is 1.38% while the model delivers a
value of 1.09%. Similarly, for the second period we observe a mean ination of 0.53% and the
model predicts a value of 0.19%. The model is much less successful at matching the moments
of the nominal interest rate and to a less extent those of output. Yet, the model does a fairly
good job at matching qualitatively changes in average levels of ination, output and interest
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rates across sub-samples.
5.3 Decomposition of the Determinants of Ination Premium
As described in the previous section, in general equilibrium, the determinants of ination
premium can be de-composed in four components: those coming from the non-linearity (con-
vexity) of the Phillips curve (
), the non-linearity of the marginal costs (
), the auxiliary
variable vt (!v and 
v) and the precautionary savings e¤ect (!y). In table 5.3 we show the
decomposition of ination premium across samples by these determinants for our calibrated
economy. It is worthnoting that the convexity of the Phillips curve with respect to oil prices,
accounts for roughly 59 and 55 percent of the ination premium in the pre and post Volcker
periods, respectively. The second determinant in importance is the convexity of the marginal
cost with respect to oil that accounts for 45 and 48 percent, respectively. For instance, out
of this e¤ect, the level of ination premium attributed to price distortions represents about
50 percent in each sample. Finally, the precautionary savings e¤ect is negative and almost
negligible.
CGG
Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
Convexity Phillips curve (
) 58.9 55.4
Marginal costs (
mc) 45.2 48.2
Indirect e¤ect: price dispersion 27.4 24.8
Direct e¤ect: convexity respect to oil prices 17.9 23.4
Auxiliary variable vt (!v and 
v) -3.9 -2.9
Precautionary Savings (!y) -0.3 -0.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Table 5.3: Ination Premium - E¤ects Decomposition
5.4 Comparing Di¤erent Monetary Policy Rules
We now evaluate how monetary policy can a¤ect the level of ination premium. We do so by
comparing the benchmark specication (CGG) with the estimated Taylor rules suggested by
Orphanides (2001) and Judd and Rudebush (1998). Table 5.4 shows that Orphanides´s gen-
erate a smaller average ination in both sub-samples. This nding is explained by the smaller
weight assigned on output in the Orphanides´s rule with respect to the CGG´s rule. This
result is consistent with threshold for the parameter y from our analytical results, equation
(4.6)
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Notice also, that the smaller average level of ination is consistent with a smaller mean level
of the nominal interest rate. Hence, the aggressiveness of the central bank towards ination
determines how the premium is distributed between ination and output means. The more
aggressive at ghting ination the central bank is, the smaller the level of ination premium
and the larger the reduction of average output. Note also that Rudebush´s rule delivers an
excessive ination premium during the pre-Volcker period (6.38%). This result is basically
explained by the higher weight over output uctuations that this rule implies.
CGG Orphanides Judd-Rudebush
Pre-
Volcker
Post-
Volcker
Pre-
Volcker
Post-
Volcker
Pre-
Volcker
Post-
Volcker
Mean Ination 1.09 0.19 0.19 0.05 6.38 0.64
Mean Output Gap (HP) -1.35 -0.23 -0.57 -0.15 -3.49 -0.35
Mean Nominal Interest Rate 4.32 0.72 0.76 0.20 25.48 2.52
S.D Deviation Ination 1.91 0.75 1.01 0.54 3.34 1.00
S.D Output Gap (HP) 2.02 0.56 2.22 0.68 1.73 0.43
S.D Nominal Interest Rate 1.64 0.45 0.82 0.28 2.91 0.62
S.D Real Oil Price 0.46 0.22 0.46 0.22 0.46 0.22
Table 5.4: Alternative Policy Rules
6 Conclusions
Traditionally New Keynesian log-linear models have been used to match second order moments.
However, they have the limitation that their solution implies certainty equivalence, neglecting
any role of uncertainty and volatility over the level of ination. To the extent that uncertainty
is important in real economies, a second order solution of the New Keynesian model is required
to improve their t to the data. In particular, this type of solution provides a link between
volatility of shocks and the average values of endogenous variables o¤ering a non-conventional
way to analyze business cycles. In this paper we have taken this approach and we show how
the interaction between volatility and the convexity of both the marginal costs and the Phillips
curve improves the ability of a standard New Keynesian model to explain the history of ination
in the USA.
The second order solution allows us to provide an additional element to the explanation
suggested by CGG for the high ination episode during the 70s. Our hypothesis puts at the
centre of the discussion the volatility of supply shocks, in particular oil price shocks. Contrary
to what a linear solution implies, a second order solution establishes the link between volatility
of oil prices and expected ination, what we called ination premium. In this paper we show
that a calibrated version of our model can match very closely the ination behavior observed in
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the USA during both the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker periods. In particular we show that the
high volatility of oil price shocks during the 70s implied an endogenous high level of ination
premium that can account for the high average ination levels observed in US during that
period. The analytical solution obtained by implementing the perturbation method shows
that the existence of the ination premium depends crucially on, rst, the convexity of both
the marginal costs and the Phillips curve and second, the response of the monetary authority.
We nd that when oil has low substitutability, marginal costs are convex in oil prices, hence
its price volatility increases the expected value of marginal costs. In addition, the reaction of
the central bank determines in equilibrium how higher volatility generated by oil price shocks
is distributed between a higher average ination and lower growth rate. Moreover, in order
to observe a positive ination premium it is required that the central bank partially reacts
to supply shocks. Another interesting and novel nding is that relative price dispersion, by
increasing the amount of labour required to produce a given level of output, increases average
wages. So, relative price dispersion amplies the e¤ect of expected marginal costs over average
ination.
Our results can be extended in many directions. First, it will be worth to explore the
e¤ect of openness in ination premium. Second, the analytical perturbation method strategy
proposed in this paper can be used to capture the e¤ects of change in a monetary policy regime
over ination. Third, it will be worth also to explore the implications of other source of shocks
in the determination in the level of ination premium. Finally, the estimation of a non-linear
Phillips curve considering the e¤ects of oil price volatility on ination will be an issue to further
explore.
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A Appendix: Equations of the Model
A.1 The system of equations
Using the the market clearing conditions that close the model, the dynamic equilibrium of the
model described in section 3 is given by the following set of 10 equations:
AGGREGATE SUPPLY
Marginal Costs
MCt =
h
(1  ) (Wt=Pt)1  +  (Qt)1  
i 1
1  
A-i
Labor market
Wt
Pt
= Y t L
v
t A-ii
Lt =

1
1 
Wt=Pt
MCt
  
Ytt A-iii
Price dispersion
t = (1  )

1 (t)" 1
1 
"=(" 1)
+ t 1 (t)" A1-iv
Phillips Curve
 (t)
" 1 = 1  (1  )

Nt
Dt
1 "
A-v
Nt = Y
1 
t MCt + Et [(t+1)
"Nt+1] A-vi
Dt = Y
1 
t + Et
h
(t+1)
" 1Dt+1
i
A-vii
AGGREGATE DEMAND
1 = Et

Yt+1
Yt
 
Rt
t+1

A-vii
MONETARY POLICY
Rt = R

Ett+1

 Yt
Y
y
A-ix
OIL PRICES
Qt = QQ

t 1 exp (qet) A-x
Table A.1: Equations of the model
The rst block represents the aggregate supply, which consists on the marginal costs, the
labor market equilibrium and the Phillips curve, which has been written recursively using the
auxiliary variables Nt and Dt. The aggregate demand block is represented with the Euler
equation and Monetary Policy block is given by the Taylor rule. The last equation describes
the dynamics of oil prices. We use this set of ten non-linear equations to obtain numerically
the second order solution of the model.
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A.2 The deterministic steady state
The non-stochastic steady state of the endogenous variables is given by: where
Ination  = 1
Auxiliary variables N = D = Y = (1  )
Interest rate R =  1
Marginal costs MC = 1=
Real wages W=P = y 1
 
1  F  11  
Output Y = y

1

 1
+  
1  F  1+ + 11  
Labor L =  l

1

 1
+  
1  F  1  + 11  
Table A.2: The steady state
F =  

Q
MC
1  
=  
 
Q
1  
F is the share of oil in the marginal costs, y and  l are constants28. Notice that the steady
state values of real wages, output and labor depend on the steady state ratio of oil prices with
respect to the marginal cost. This implies that permanent changes in oil prices would generate
changes in the steady state of this variables. Also, as the standard New-Keynesian models, the
marginal cost in steady state is equal to the inverse of the mark-up (MC = 1= = ("  1) =").
Since monopolistic competition a¤ects the steady state of the model, output in steady state is
below the e¢ cient level. We call to this feature a distorted steady state.
A.3 The exible price equilibrium
The exible price equilibrium of the endogenous variables is consistent with zero ination in
every period (i.e. .Ft = 1). In this case marginal costs are constant, equal to its steady state
value, and the other variables are a¤ected by the oil shock.
Notice that the exible price equilibrium is not e¢ cient, since there are distortions from
monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market (i.e. MCFt > 1).
28More precisely: y =

1
1 
  
1  
1+v
+v
and  l =

1
1 
  
1  
1 
+v
.
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Ination Ft = 1
Interest rate 1=RFt = Et

1 F (Qt+1=Q)1  
1 F (Qt=Q)1  
 
Marginal costs MCFt = 1=
Real wages WFt =P
F
t = y
1


1  F  Qt=Q1   11  
Output Y Ft = y

1

 1
+

1  F  Qt=Q1   1+ + 11  
Labor LFt =  l

1

 1
+

1  F  Qt=Q1   1  + 11  
Table A.3: The exible price equilibrium
B Appendix: The second order solution of the model
B.1 The recursive AS equation
We divide the equation for the aggregate price level (3.15) by P 1 "t and make Pt=Pt 1 = t
1 =  (t)
 (1 ") + (1  )

P t (z)
Pt
1 "
(B.1)
Aggregate ination is function of the optimal price level of rm z. Also, from equation (3.14)
the optimal price of a typical rm can be written as:
P t (z)
Pt
=
Nt
Dt
where, after using the denition for the stochastic discount factor: t;t+k = C
 
t+k=C
 
t Pt=Pt+k,
we dene Nt and Dt as follows:
Nt = Et
" 1X
k=0
()k+1F "t;t+kYt+kC
 
t+kMCt+k
#
(B.2)
Dt = Et
" 1X
k=0
()k+1F " 1t;t+kYt+kC
 
t+k
#
(B.3)
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Nt and Dt can be expanded as:
Nt = YtC
 
t MCt + Et
"
"t+1
1X
k=0
()kF "t+1;t+1+kYt+1+kC
 
t+1+kMCt+1+k
#
(B.4)
Dt = YtC
 
t + Et
"
" 1t+1
1X
k=0
()kF " 1t+1;t+1+kC
 
t+1+kYt+1+k
#
(B.5)
where we have used the denition for Ft;t+k = Pt+k=Pt.
The Phillips curve with oil prices is given by the following three equations:
 (t)
" 1 = 1  (1  )

P t (z)
Pt
1 "
(B.6)
Nt = Y
1 
t MCt + Et (t+1)
"Nt+1 (B.7)
Dt = Y
1 
t + Et (t+1)
" 1Dt+1 (B.8)
where we have reordered equation (B.1) and we have used equations (B.2) and (B.3) eval-
uated one period forward to replace Nt+1 and Dt+1 in equations (B.4) and (B.5).
B.2 The second order approximation of the system
B.2.1 The second order approximation of the Phillips Curve
The second order expansion for equations (B:6), (B:7) and (B:8) are:
t =
(1  )

(nt   dt)  1
2
("  1)
1   (t)
2 +O

kqt; qk3

(B.9)
nt = (1  )

at +
1
2
a2t

+ 

Etbt+1 +
1
2
Etb
2
t+1

  1
2
n2t +O

kqt; qk3

(B.10)
dt = (1  )

ct +
1
2
c2t

+ 

Etet+1 +
1
2
Ete
2
t+1

  1
2
d2t +O

kqt; qk3

(B.11)
Where we have dened the auxiliary variables at,bt+1,ct and et+1 as:
at  (1  ) yt +mct bt+1  "t+1 + nt+1
ct  (1  ) yt et+1  ("  1)t+1 + dt+1
33
Subtract equations (B:10) and (B:11), and using the fact that X2   Y 2 = (X   Y ) (X + Y ),
for any two variables X and Y :
nt   dt = (1  ) (at   ct) + 1
2
(1  ) (at   ct) (at + ct) (B.12)
+Et (bt+1   et+1) + 1
2
Et (bt+1   et+1) (bt+1 + et+1)
 1
2
(nt   dt) (nt + dt) +O

kqt; qk3

Plugging in the values of at, bt+1, ct and et+1 into equation (B:12), we obtain (B:13)
nt   dt = (1  )mct + 1
2
(1  )mct (2 (1  ) yt +mct) (B.13)
+Et (t+1 + nt+1   dt+1) + 1
2
Et (t+1 + nt+1   dt+1) ((2"  1)t+1 + nt+1 + dt+1)
 1
2
(nt   dt) (nt + dt) +O

kqt; qk3

Taking forward one period equation (B:9), we can solve for nt+1   dt+1:
nt+1   dt+1 = 
1  t+1 +
1
2

1  
("  1)
1   (t+1)
2 +O

kqt; qk3

(B.14)
replace equation (B:14) in (B:13) and make use of the auxiliary variable zt = (nt + dt) = (1  )
nt   dt = (1  )mct + 1
2
(1  )mct (2 (1  ) yt +mct) (B.15)
+

1  

Ett+1 +

"  1
1   + "

Et
2
t+1 + (1  )Ett+1zt+1

 1
2

1   (1  )tzt +O

kqt; qk3

Notice that we use only the linear part of equation (B:14) when we replace nt+1   dt+1 in the
quadratic terms because we are interested in capture terms only up to second order of accuracy.
Similarly, we make use of the linear part of equation (B:9) to replace (nt   dt) = 1 t in the
right hand side of equation (B:15).
Replace equation (B:15) in (B:9):
t = mct +
1
2
mct (2 (1  ) yt +mct) (B.16)
+

Ett+1 +

"  1
1   + "

Et
2
t+1 + (1  )Ett+1zt+1

 1
2
(1  )tzt   1
2
("  1)
1   (t)
2 +O

kqt; qk3

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for
  (1  )

(1  )
where zt has the following linear expansion:
zt = 2 (1  ) yt +mct + Et

2"  1
1  t+1 + zt+1

+O

kqt; qk2

(B.17)
Dene the following auxiliary variable:
vt = t +
1
2

"  1
1   + "

2t +
1
2
(1  )tzt (B.18)
Using the denition for vt, equation (B:16) can be expressed as:
vt = mct +
1
2
mct (2 (1  ) yt +mct) + 1
2
"2t + Etvt+1 +O

kqt; qk2

(B.19)
which is equation (4:3) in the main text.
Moreover, the linear part of equation (B.19) is:
t = mct + Et (t+1) +O

kqt; qk2

which is the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, ination depends linearly on the real
marginal costs and expected ination.
B.2.2 The MC equation and the labor market equilibrium
The real marginal cost (3.12) and the labor market equations (3.4 and 3.22) have the following
second order expansion:
mct =
 
1  F wt + F qt + 1
2
F
 
1  F  (1   ) (wt   qt)2 +Okqt; qk3 (B.20)
wt = lt + yt (B.21)
lt = yt    (wt  mct) + bt (B.22)
Where wt and bt are, respectively, the log of the deviation of the real wage and the price
dispersion measure from their respective steady state. Notice that equations (B:21)and (B:22)
are not approximations, but exact expressions.
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Solving equations (B:21) and (B:22) for the equilibrium real wage:
wt =
1
1 +  
h
( + ) yt +  mct + v bti (B.23)
Plugging the real wage in equation (B:20) and simplifying:
mct =  ( + v) yt + (1  ) (qt) + v bt (B.24)
+
1
2
1   
1  F 
2 (1  ) [( + v) yt   qt]2 +O

kqt; qk3

where    1  F  =  1 + v F  :This is the equation (i) in the main text. This expression is
the second order expansion of the real marginal cost as a function of output and the oil prices.
B.2.3 The price dispersion measure
The price dispersion measure is given by
t =
Z 1
0

Pt (z)
Pt
 "
dz
Since a proportion 1   of intermediate rms set prices optimally, whereas the other  set the
price last period, this price dispersion measure can be written as:
t = (1  )

P t (z)
Pt
 "
+ 
Z 1
0

Pt 1 (z)
Pt
 "
dz
Dividing and multiplying by (Pt 1) " the last term of the RHS:
t = (1  )

P t (z)
Pt
 "
+ 
Z 1
0

Pt 1 (z)
Pt 1
 "Pt 1
Pt
 "
dz
Since P t (z) =Pt = Nt=Dt and Pt=Pt 1 = t, using equation (3:8) in the text and the denition
for the dispersion measure lagged on period, this can be expressed as
t = (1  )
 
1   (t)" 1
1  
!"=(" 1)
+ t 1 (t)" (B.25)
which is a recursive representation of t as a function of t 1 and t.
Benigno and Woodford (2005) show that a second order approximation of the price disper-
sion depends solely on second order terms on ination. Then, the second order approximation
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of equation (B.25) is: bt =  bt 1 + 1
2
"

1  
2
t +O

kqt; qk3

(B.26)
which is equation (2  ii) in the main text. Moreover, we can use equation (B:26) to write the
innite sum:
1X
t=to
t to bt =  1X
t=to
t to bt 1 + 1
2
"

1  
1X
t=to
t to
2t
2
+O

kqt; qk3

(1  )
1X
t=to
t to bt =  bto 1 + 12" 1  
1X
t=to
t to
2t
2
+O

kqt; qk3

Dividing by (1  ) and using the denition of  :
1X
t=to
t to bt = 
1  
bto 1 + 12 "
1X
t=to
t to
2t
2
+O

kqt; qk3

(B.27)
The discounted innite sum of bt is equal to the sum of two terms, on the initial price dispersion
and the discounted innite sum of 2t .
B.2.4 The IS
Similarly, the second order expansion of the IS is:
yt = Etyt+1   1

(rt   Ett+1)  1
2
Et

(yt   yt+1)  1

(rt   t+1)
2
+

kqt; qk3

(B.28)
Replacing the linear solution of yt inside the quadratic part of equation (B:28):
yt = Etyt+1   1

(rt   Ett+1)  1
2
Et

yt+1 +
1

t+1   Et

yt+1 +
1

t+1
2
+

kqt; qk3

(B.29)
where Et

yt+1 +
1
t+1   Et
 
yt+1 +
1
t+1
2
is the variance of
 
yt+1 +
1
t+1

.
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B.3 The system in two equations
Since the quadratic terms of the second order Taylor expansions of the equations depend on
the linear solution, we can use the latter to solve for the formers. Let´s assume the linear
solution for output, ination and the auxiliary variable zt29
yt = a1qt +O

kqt; qk2

t = b1qt +O

kqt; qk2

zt = c1qt +O

kqt; qk2

Additionally, we have the transition process for the oil price:
qt = qt 1 + qet
where e~iid (0; 1) and  =
p
1  2:
B.3.1 The AS
Replacing the equation for the price dispersion in the equation for the marginal costs, the
latter can be expressed as:
mct =  (v + ) yt + (1  ) qt + v bt + 1
2
e
mcq2t +O kqt; qk3 (B.30)
where e
mc = (1  )2 1  1 F (( + ) a1   1)2 + " 1  (b1)2 :
Similarly, the Phillips curve equation can be expressed as:
vt = mct + Etvt+1 +
1
2

q
2
t +O

kqt; qk3

(B.31)
where 
 = " (b1)
2 +  [ (v + ) a1 + (1  )] [2 (1  ) yt +  (v + ) a1 + (1  )]. We have
used the linear solution of output and ination to express 
 in terms of a1 and b1:
Replace the equation for the marginal costs in the second order expansion of the Phillips
Curve and iterate forward, the Phillips curve can be expressed as the discounted innite sum:
vt =
1X
t=to
t to

yyt + qqt + v bt + 1
2
e
mcq2t + 12
q2t

+

kqt; qk3

(B.32)
29From the linear expansion of the denition of zt we can solve for c1, where c1 =
1
1 
n
[2 (1  ) +  ( + v)] a1 + (1  ) +  2" 11 b1
o
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where y =  ( + ) and q =  (1  ). Make use of equation (B:27), the discounted
innite sum of bt, vt becomes:
vt =
1X
t=to
t to

yyt + qqt +
1
2
"v2t +
1
2
e
mcq2t + 12
q2t

(B.33)
+
v
1  
bt 1 + kqt; qk3
Assuming that we depart from an initial state where the price dispersion is small, that isbt 1 ' 0 up to second order, then equation (B.33) can be expressed recursively as30:
vt = yyt + qqt +
1
2
"v2t +
1
2
e
mcq2t + 12
q2t + Etvt+1 + kqt; qk3 (B.34)
Let´s consider the total second order terms coming from the marginal costs:

mcq
2
t = "v
2
t + 
e
mcq2t (B.35)
then, 
mc = "v (b1)
2 + e
mc:
The auxiliary variable vt is also a¤ected by second order terms:
vt = t +
1
2
e
vq2t (B.36)
where e
v = h " 11  + " b21 + (1  ) b1c1i :Etvt+1 becomes:
Etvt+1 = Ett+1 +
1
2
e
vEtq2t+1 (B.37)
= Ett+1 +
1
2
e
v  2q2t + 22q
Replacing equations (B.35), (B.36) and (B.37) in (B.34), we obtain the equation (4.1) in the
text:
t = yyt + qqt + Ett+1 +
1
2
(
mc +
 +
v) q
2
t +
1
2
!v
2
q +

kqt; qk3

(B.38)
where 
v =  e
v  1  2 and !v = e!v2: 
mc;
;
v and !v are respectively the second
order terms coming from the marginal costs, the Phillips Curve and the auxiliary variable vt:
30We make the assumption that the initial price dispersion is small to make the analysis
analytically tractable. However, in the numerical exercise we work with the general case and
the results are quantitatively similar.
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B.3.2 The aggregate demand
Replace the policy rule (3.26) in the second order expansion of the IS (B.29), assuming there
is not interest rate smoothing (that is r = 0) :
yt = Etyt+1   1


(   1)Ett+1 + yyt

+ (B.39)
 1
2
Et

yt+1 +
1

t+1   Et

yt+1 +
1

t+1
2
+O

kqt; qk3

This can be expressed as:
yt = Et (yt+1)  1


(   1)Ett+1 + yyt

+
1
2
!y
2
q +O

kqt; qk3

(B.40)
where:
!y
2
q =  Et

a1qt+1 +
1

b1qt+1   Et

a1qt+1 +
1

b1qt+1
2
(B.41)
Similar to the previous sub-section, the IS risk premium can be written as a function of the
linear solution of ination and output:
!y =  

a1 +
1

b1
2
< 0 (B.42)
Note that the risk premium component of the IS is negative, capturing precautionary savings
due to output and ination volatility.
B.4 The perturbation method
The policy functions of the second order solution for output and ination can be written in
the following form:
yt =
1
2
ao
2
q + a1qt +
1
2
a2 (qt)
2 +O

kqt; qk3

(B.43)
t =
1
2
bo
2
q + b1qt +
1
2
b2 (qt)
2 +O

kqt; qk3

where the as and bs are the unknown coe¢ cients that we need to solve for and O

kqt; qk3

denotes terms on q and q of order equal or higher than 3: We express the dynamics of the oil
price as:
qt = qt 1 + qet (B.44)
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where the oil shock has been normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one, i.e.
e~iid (0; 1) :Also, we set  =
p
1  2 in order to express V (qt) = 2q .
In order to solve for the 6 unknown coe¢ cients, we use the following algorithm that consist
in solving recursively for three systems of two equations. This allow us to obtain algebraic
solutions for the unknown coe¢ cients. We follow the following steps:
1. We replace the closed forms of the policy functions (B.43) and the transition equation
for the shock (B.44) in the equations for the AS (B.38) and the AD (B.40).
2. Solve for a1 and b1: we take the partial derivatives with respect to qt to the two equations
of step 1, then we proceed to evaluate them in the non-stochastic steady state (i.e. when
qt = 0 and q = 0). Then, the only unknowns left are a1 and b1 for two equations. We
proceed to solve for a1 and b1 as function of the deep parameters of the model.
a1 =   [(   1) ]q
1
1
< 0
b1 =

 (1  ) + y

q
1
1
> 0
3. Solve for a2 and b2: similar to step 2, we take successive partial derivatives with respect
to qt and qt to the two equations of step 1 and we evaluate them at the non-stochastic
steady state. Then, we solve for the unknowns a2 and b2:
a2 =  

(   1) 2

(
 +
mc)
1
2
< 0
b2 =


 
1  2+ y (
 +
mc) 12> 0
4. Solve for a0 and b0: similar to steps 2 and 3, we take successive partial derivatives with
respect to q and q to the two equations of step 1 and we evaluate them at the non-
stochastic steady state. Then, we solve for the unknowns a0 and b0: The solution for the
coe¢ cients is given by:
ao =   (   1)
 
b2
2 + !
  (1  )  a22 + !y 10
bo =  b22+

y
 
b2
2 + !

+y
 
a2
2 + !y
 1
0
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where we have dened the following auxiliary variables:
0=(   1)1+(1  )y
1=(   1) y+(1  )

 (1  ) + y

2=(   1) 2y+
 
1  2 h (1  )2 + yi
where 0, 1, and 2 are all positive.
B.4.1 The Ination premium
The ination premium is given by:
E () =
1
2
(bo + b2)
2
q
replace the solution for bo:
bo + b2 = b2
2 +
y
 
b2
2 + !

+ y
 
a2
2 + !y

0
(B.45)
Replace the solution of a2 and the denition of ; and collect for b2 :
bo + b2 =
1
0

b2

2o +

y   y
   1
 (1  2) + y
 
1  2+ y! + y!y (B.46)
After some algebra, it can be expressed as:
bo + b2 =
1
0

b2y
 (1  2) + y
h
2 + 2
 
1  2 (1  )2i+ y! + y!y (B.47)
Replace the denition for b2 :
bo + b2 =
1
0

y (
 +
mc +
v) (1 + 	) + y!v + y!y
	
(B.48)
where 	 = 2
 
1  2 (1  )2 =2. 	 is positive and very small for  close to 1
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C Appendix: Endogenous Trade-o¤
From equation (B.24), we can derive linearly the marginal cost as function of output and oil
price shocks, as follows:
mct =
 
1  F  ( + v)
1 +  F
yt + 
F (1 + v )
1 +  F
qt +O

kqt; qk2

(C.1)
This equation can be also written in terms of parameters y and q; dened previously in the
main text, as follows:
mct =
y

yt +
q

qt +O

kqt; qk2

(C.2)
Under exible prices, mct = 0: Condition that denes the natural level of output in terms of
the oil price shock :
yFt =  
q
y
qt +O

kqt; qk2

(C.3)
Notice that in this economy the exible price level of output does not coincide with the e¢ cient
one since the steady state is distorted by monopolistic competition The e¢ cient level of output
is dened as the level of output with exible prices under perfect competition, we use equation
(C:2) to calculate this e¢ cient level of output under the condition that  = 1 as follows:
yEt =  
E
(1  E)
 
1  F 
F
q
y
qt +O

kqt; qk2

(C.4)
Where E =  
 
Q
1  
: This parameter can be also expressed in terms of the participation
of oil under exible prices as follows:
E = F  1
Notice that when there is no monopolistic distortion or when  = 1 we have that E = F
and yEt = y
F
t .
Using the denition of e¢ cient level of output, we can write the marginal costs equation
in terms an e¢ cient output gap, xt: Where xt =
 
yt   yEt

in the following way
mct =
y

 
yt   yEt

+
1

t +O

kqt; qk2

(C.5)
Where
t = y
 
1  
F
(1  F )
 
1  E
E
!
yEt
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Using equations (C.5) and (3.24), the Phillips curve can be written as follows:
t = Ett+1 + yxt + t +O

kqt; qk2

(C.6)
This equation corresponds to equation (3:28) in the main text. We can further write t in
terms of the oil price shocks using the denition of the e¢ cient level of output:
t =
q
y

F   E
(1  E)F

qt
The dynamic IS equation can also be written in terms of the e¢ cient output gap.
xt = Etxt+1   1

 
it   Ett+1   rEt

+O

kqt; qk2

(C.7)
where rEt is the natural interest rate, the real interest rate consistent with y
E
t :
rEt =  (1  ) yEt +O

kqt; qk2

which in turn can be written as follows:
rEt =   (1  )
E
(1  E)
 
1  F 
F
q
y
qt +O

kqt; qk2

Notice that when there is no monopolistic distortion or when  = 1 we have that E = F ,
which implies that there is no an endogenous trade o¤.
t = 0 8t
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